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RECENT DECISIONS

rather than subscription which the New York statute requires.1 6 Yet Arizona,
California and Virginia construe their statutes to forbid probate of a will on similar
facts. 17 Clearly the will in the principal case could not be probated in New York,
where all the requirements of the statute must be satisfied' 8 and apply alike to all
wills, with the single exception of nuncupative wills made by a soldier or sailor
while in actual military or naval service or by a mariner while at sea.19 Recent
decisions in New York and elsewhere show a tendency toward a more liberal construction of the statute,20 yet their liberality is, to say the least, conservative compared to the decision in the principal case.

RECENT STATUTES
CpmnAn , LAw-A NEW DEFINITION or LARCENY.-The New York Legislature,
by an amendment to the Penal Law,1 seeks to eliminate the procedural difficulties
in prosecutions for larceny, which up until now have persisted because of the technical distinctions differentiating larceny, false pretenses and embezzlement. 2 The

16. N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW (1938) § 21: "Every last will and testament . . . (1) shall
be subscribed by the testator at the end of his will."
17. In re Tyrrel's Estate, 17 Ariz. 418, 153 Pac. 767 (1915) ; In re Estate of Manchester, 174 Cal. 417, 163 Pac. 358 (1917); Warwick v. Warwick, 86 Va. 596, 10 S. E.
843 (1890).
18. Matter of Perrine, 109 Misc. 459, 180 N. Y. Supp. 333 (1919). Herein the court
denied probate to a holographic document, unattested, signed by the decedent and enclosed in a sealed envelope, on which, in addition to notation "Last Will and Testament
of Isabelle Perrine", appeared the names of two witnesses. It was held that this document
had not been executed as required by N. Y. DEC. EsT. LAW (1938)

§ 21.

In Vogel v.

Lehritter, 139 N. Y. 223, 34 N. E. 914 (1893), a holographic document signed by deceased,
attested on sealed envelope in which signed document was enclosed was held invalid. In
Matter of Kellem, 52 N. Y. 517 (1873) the court pointed out that failure to comply with
any one of these New York statutory requirements is absolutely fatal to the admission
of the paper to probate.
19. As amended L. 1942, c. 668, N. Y. DEc., EST. LAW, § 16: "No nuncupative or unwritten or holographic will, bequeathing or devising personal or real estate, shall be valid,
unless made by a soldier or a sailor while in actual military or naval service or by a
mariner while at sea, and when made in the following manner: . . . (2) A holographic
will when written entirely in the handwriting of the maker even though the same be
unattested." Sed quere: Does the legislature intend no longer to require the signature of
the testator to a holographic will made under these circumstances?
20. In Matter of Eyett, 124 Misc. 523, 209 N. Y. Supp. 251 (1925), where the testator's
signature appeared only in attestation clause of a holographic will but below the dispositive parts, the court probated the will. Matter of Field, 204 N. Y. 448, 97 N. E. -881
(1912) ; In re Morgan's Estate, 200 Cal. 400, 253 Pac. 702 (1927) ; Forrest v. Turner, 146
Va. 734, 133 S. E. 69 (1926); Graham v. Edwards, 162 Ky. 771, 173 S..W. 127 (1915).
1. N. Y. Laws 1942, c. 732, effective Sept. 1, 1942, repealing § 1290 of the Penal Law,
substituting in its place a new section with the same numbering and adding a further
§ 1290-a.
2. The difficulty in distinguishing between larceny by trick and the statutory crime
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text of the amendment is preceded by a "Declaration of Public Policy" which states
that it is the intention of the legislature to abolish the distinctions between the various forms of theft as previously defined in section 1290 of the Penal Law.
Although the language defining larceny has been only slightly altered, the important change consists in the elimination of circumstances, as matter of defense, which
have heretofore differentiated the various forms of the crime. Before the enactment
of the Penal Code in 1881, 3 what was there defined as larceny constituted three
separate crimes: larceny by trespass, in which there is an unlawful taking and
asportation, 4 and larceny by trick and device, in which by such means the thief
fraudulently obtains possession of the goods,5 both forms of common law larceny; '
false pretenses, in which the owner parts not only with possession but also with
title in reliance upon a misrepresentation as to a past or existing fact;7 and embezzlement in which a person rightfully in possession of a chattel forms the intent
to convert it and does so.5 The new section 1290 states that it will now be immaterial whether the taking be with or without the owners consent, whether in the
first instance possession, or title be obtained lawfully, or whether the owner intended
to part with possession or title, or both, provided there is the intent to steal.0
It will thus be seen that, while the new definition of larceny gives no extension to
the scope of the crime of larceny, as it has formerly been defined in the Penal
of false pretenses became apparent in the first case which recognized the former crime,
Rex v. Pear, 1 Leach 212, 168 Eng. Rep. R. 208 (C. C. R. 1799), and this difficulty has
continued. People v. Noblett, 244 N. Y. 355, 155 N. E. 670 (1927). Beale, The Borderland of Larceny (1892) 6 HARv. L. Rav. 244; Note, Larceny, Embezzlement and Obtaining
Property by False Pretenses (1920) 20 COL. L. REv. 318. Upon the nebulous distinction

between custody and possession very often depended the determination whether the crime
was larceny or embezzlement, see Rex v. Bazeley, 2 Leach 835, 168 Eng. Rep. R. 517
(1799); People v. McDonald, 43 N. Y. 61 (1870); Regina v. Reed, 6 Cox C. C. 284
(1854) ; People v. Burr, 41 How. Prac. 293 (N. Y. 1871) ; In re Grin, 112 Fed. 790
(C. C., N. D. Cal. 1901), aff'd 187 U. S. 181 (1902) ; or upon the exact point of time at

which the intent to steal was formed, as in the case of a finder of lost property, see
Regina v. Thurborn, 1 Den. 387, 169 Eng. Rep. R. 293 (1849); or upon the issue of
breaking the bulk, see Carrier's Case, Year Book, 13 Edw. IV, 9, pl. 5 (1473); Nichols v.
People, 17 N. Y. 114 (1858).
3. N. Y. Laws 1881, c. 676.
4. Harrison v. People, 50 N. Y. 518 (1872); Hildebrand v. People, 56 N. Y. 394 (1874).
5. Smith v. People, 53 N. Y. 111 (1873) ; Loomis v. People, 67 N. Y. 322 (1876);
People v. Miller, 169 N. Y. 339, 62 N. E. 418 (1902).
6. The original form of larceny required a trespass until it was decided in Rex. v.
Pear, 1 Leach 212 (C. C. R. 1799) that fraud might take the place of force.
7. People v. Noblett, 244 N. Y. 355, 155 N. E. 670 (1927) ; People v. Stiller, 255
App. Div. 480, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 865, aff'd 280 N. Y. 518, 19 N. E. (2d) 923 (1939).
8. People v. Hennessey, 15 Wend. 147 (N. Y. 1836); People v. Meadows, 199 N. Y.
1, 92 N. E. 128 (1910) ; People v. Epstein, 245 N. Y. 234, 157 N. E. 121 (1927).
9. It might have been better if the word "larceny", suggesting as it does the common
law crime, had been entirely abandoned for the more inclusive word "theft". See Pennsylvania Indemnity Fire Corp. v. Aldridge, 117 F. (2d) 774 (App. D. C., 1941); Van
Vechten v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 239 N. Y. 303, 146 N. E. 432 (1925); People
v. Stevenson, 103 Cal. App. 82, 284 Pac. 487 (1930).

RECENT STATUTES

1942]

Law, it does in effect create a truly consolidated new crime, which is single, indivisible and comparatively simple to understand. 0
The previous attempt of the legislature in 188111 to simplify the law by consolidating the three crimes into one called "larceny" failed because the courts did
not interpret the statute as affecting any procedural reform. Prior to the 1942
amendment it was held that each form of the crime of larceny had to be prosecuted
by a separate indictment or by a separate count of the*indictment, People v. Duinar.'2
In that case the court pointed out that under Section 1290 there were four distinct
and separate acts by which a person may commit larceny and that under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure,'" the indictment must charge not only
the crime but also state the act constituting the crime. If the indictment contained
separate counts containing all forms of the crime, the court might allow only one
count to go to the jury,14 and if more than one count were submitted to the jury,
its verdict might be upset if the facts did not warrant conviction under one of
the counts submitted. 15 For instance, where the act committed by the defendant
constituted common larceny, but the court erroneously dismissed the indictment and
permitted conviction under another indictment charging embezzlement, the conviction
was reversed.'0 Similarly, if the indictment contains two counts, one for larceny
by trick and the other for false pretenses (the crime actually committed) and the
court dismisses the latter count and permits conviction under the former, the conviction must be reversed. 17 In both of these cases the defendant had clearly committed the statutory crime, but he went unpunished because he could not again
be put in jeopardy of conviction. The New York courts have long recognized the
need for remedial legislation.' 8 At times in order to prevent a plain miscarriage of
10. The old distinctions between larceny, embezzlement and false pretenses will continue to be important in civil litigation. See Sweet & Co. v. Provident Loan Society, 279
N. Y. 540, 18 N. E. (2d) 847 (1939).
11.

See supra note 3.

12.

106 N. Y. 502, 13 N. E. 325 (1887).

13.

CODE O C ani.AL PROCEDURE § 275.

Even though under the new form of sim-

plified indictment, provided for in N. Y. Laws 1929, c. 176, CODE oF CR moA PROCEDURE
§§ 295-a-295-k, the indictment need not specify the manner in which the crime charged
was committed (C. C. P. §§ 295-b, 295-c and 295-f), the defendant would be entitled to
a bill of particulars as to such matter. See People v. Bogdanoff, 254 N. Y. 16, 171 N. E.
890 (1930).

14. People v. Noblett, 244 N. Y. 355, 155 N. E. 670.
15. People v. Cohen, 148 App. Div. 205, 133 N. Y. Supp. 103 (1st Dep't 1911). See
People v. Lazar, 271 N. Y. 27, 2 N. E. (2d) 32 (1936), where the court said, 271 N. Y.
at 31, 2 N. E. (2d) at 33: "The case was submitted to the jury on two distinct theories,
one of which was basically wrong. We cannot speculate as to which theory it adopted."
16. Nichols v. People, 17 N. Y. 114.
17. People v. Noblett, 244 N. Y. 355, 155 N. E. 670.
18. In Nichols v. People, 17 N. Y. 114, 120-121, Judge Pratt reluctantly concluded that
"we must propound the law as we find it, . . ." judge Lehman in People v. Noblett,
244 N. Y. 355, 359, 155 N. E. 670, 671, said: "Narrow technical distinctions by which a
wrongdoer may escape the consequences of a crime hinder the administration of justice.
The courts which administer the law fail to function properly when the penalty which the
law has placed upon the commission of a crime may be evaded by the proven criminal
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justice the courts have been forced to engage in subtle reasoning for the purpose
of suiting the facts to the particular form of the crime charged. 19 The strong dis20
senting opinion of Judge Crane, delivered fifteen years ago, in People v. Noblett
has undoubtedly been instrumental in bringing about this long delayed revision of
2
the law. 1
The awkward problem presented to the prosecutor resulting from the narrow dis22
tinction between these crimes, .has caused the enactment of legislation in England
and in many of the States.23 However, in most instances the relief granted has been
only partial, either due to shortcomings in the enactment itself or the conservative
interpretation the statute has received from the courts. 24
Massachusetts, in 1931, passed a statute which at least in one respect, may have
served as a model for the New York legislation.25 Under the Massachusetts law an
indictment sufficiently charges the various forms of the crime, if it states that the
defendant "did steal" the chattel.2 6 The new section 1290-a of the Penal Law also
provides that it will be sufficient if the indictment charges that the accused, with
the required intent, "stole" the property and "is supported by proof of the commission by the accused of any one of the acts that constitute larceny as defined
in this article."
The legislature may have inadvertently added a procedural requirement which
was not intended. Previous to this statute it was sufficient if an indictment charged
larceny by trick in the common law form, without setting forth the false pretense, if
such were the trick or device used to fraudulently obtain possession of the property.27
However, it was always necessary to allege in the indictment at least one of the
misrepresentations, where the form of the crime was obtaining property by false
through subtle reasoning based on obsolete theory."
19. Loomis v. People, 67 N. Y. 322 (1876); People v. Miller, 169 N. Y. 339, 62 N. E.
418; People v. Stiller, 255 App. Div. 480, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 868, aff'd 280 N. Y. 518, 19
N. E. (2d) 923 (1939).
20. 244 N. Y. 355, 155 N. E. 670.
21. See Fuld, The New Larceny Law, 107 N. Y. L. J. (May 19, 1942), p. 2124, col. 1-3.
22. 7 & 8 Geo. IV c. 29, § 53 (1827) permits a conviction under a false pretenses
indictment, even though the evidence shows larceny; 4 & 5 Geo. V, c. 58, § 39 (1914)
provides for conviction of false pretenses, larceny or embezzlement even though the indictment is for larceny, embezzlement or larceny respectively; § 5 of the Criminal Appeal
Act of 1907 (7 Edw. VII, c. 23) allows the Court of Criminal Appeal to substitute for
the jury's verdict a verdict of another offense, if it appears to the court that the jury
found facts warranting such a verdict.
23. ARx. STATS. (Pope, 1937) c. 42, § 3075; CAL. PENAL CODE (Deering, 1941) §§ 484,
951, 952; DEL. REv. CODE (1935) c. 150, § 5217, 37; ILL. REv. STATS. (1939) c. 38, § 253;
KAS. GEN. STATS. (1935) § 21553; MINN. STATS. (Mason, 1927) c. 101, § 10358; MONT.
REv. CODE (1935) c. 43, § 11368.
24. HALL & GLUECK, CASES ON CsmdmAL LAW (1940) 226-228; Note (1938) 22 MI.NN.
L. REv. 211.
25. MASS. GEN LAWS (1931)

c. 266, § 30, defining larceny; id. c. 277, § 39 defining

the words "larceny" and "stealing".
26. MASS. GEN. LAWS (1931) c. 277, § 79; Commonwealth v. Kelley, 184 Mass. 320,
68 N. E. 346 (1903).
27. People v. Laurence, 137 N. Y. 517, 33 N. E. 547 (1893).

RECENT STATUTES
pretenses. 28 The new amendment provides: "If, however, the theft was effected by
means of any false or fraudulent representation or pretense, evidence thereof may
9
not be received at the trial unless the indictment or information alleges such means.' '2
Does this mean that where the trick or device by which common law larceny is committed takes the form of a misrepresentation, it must be alleged in the indictment?
It seems more plausible that the legislature was merely attempting to codify the
old rule, and not attempting to increase the burden of the prosecution.
The new amendment, preceded as it is by the clear declaration of the legislative
intent, should, if that intent is given effect by the courts, eliminate the needless
and obsolete technicalities which have hampered tie prosecution in this field of
criminal law. It may well serve as model legislation for other states.

MISTAKE OF LAw-DISTINCTION BETWEEN MISTAKE OF LAW AND MISTAKE OF FACT

ABo LISHE.-The history of mistake of law has completed a cycle, insofar as New

York State is concerned, and the law now is substantially the same as it was prior
to the 19th Century. Before 1802, no distinction had been made in civil cases
between a mistake of fact and a mistake of law.1 In that year, however, in the case
of Bilbie v. Lumlky, 2 Lord Ellenborough in refusing to grant restitution for a mistake of law said, "Every man must be taken to be cognizant of the law; otherwise3
there is no saying to what extent the excuse of ignorance might not be carried."
28. People v. Blanchard, 90 N. Y. 314 (1882); People v. Peckens, 153 N. Y. 576, 588,
47 N. E. 883, 886 (1897). In false pretenses, as distinct from larceny by trick, the misrepresentation had to be of a particular *kind, i.e., it had to refer to a past or existing
fact. People v. Miller, 169 N. Y. 339, 62 N. E. 418 (1902); People v. Sloane, 254 App.
Div. 780, aff'd 279 N. Y. 724, 17 N. E. (2d) 141 (1939). The difficulties this requirement
has caused may be seen in a recent decision, Brennan v. State, 3 N. W. (2d) 217 (Neb.
1942).
29.

N. Y. Laws 1942, c. 732, PENAL LAW § 1290-a.

(Italics added.)

1. Hewer v. Bartholomew, Cro. Eiz. 614, 78 Eng. Rep. R. 855 (1598); Bonnel v.
Foulke, 2 Sid. 4, 82 Eng. Rep. R. 1224 (1657); Turner v. Turner, 2 Rep. Ch. 154, 21
Eng. Rep. R. 644 (1679); Onions v. Tyrer, 2 Vern. 741, 23 Eng. Rep. R. 1085 (1716).
In Lansdown v. Lansdown, Mos. 364, 25 Eng. Rep. R. 441 (1730), the Lord Chancellor
said at 365, 25 Eng. Rep. R. at 441: "That maxim of law, Ignorantia juris non excusat,
was in regard to the public, that ignorance cannot be pleaded in excuse of crimes, but
did not hold in civil cases." Bingham v. Bingham, 1 Vesey, Sr., 126, 27 Eng. Rep. R. 934
(1748). In Farmer v. Arundel, 2 Black. W. 824, 96 Eng. Rep. R. 485 (1772), De Grey,
C.J., said in a dictum at 825, 96 Eng. Rep. R. at 486: "When money is paid by one
man to another, on a mistake either of fact or of law, or by deceit, this action will
certainly lie." Bize v. Dickason, 1 T. R. 285, 99 Eng. Rep. R. 1097 (1786).
2. 2 East 469, 102 Eng. Rep. R. 448 (1802). Perhaps the reason for the decision was
the ignorance of the counsel for the plaintiff. Lord Ellenborough asked counsel whether
he could state any case where a recovery was had for money paid under a mistake of
law. The lawyer did not answer and Lord Ellenborough continued with his decision.
Id. at 470, 102 Eng. Rep. R. at 449. See also note 1 supra, and RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION (1937), ch. 2, Topic 3, Introductory Note.
3. Bilbie v. Lumley, 2 East 469, 472, 102 Eng. Rep. R. 448, 449.
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That doctrine has been generally accepted in both this country and in England, even
though the distinction is illogical and the basis for the decision in the above case is
without reason.4 The distinction, with regard to New York, is merely of historic
interest today. On April 29, 1942, the Legislature inserted into the Civil Practice
Act a new section, § 112-f, which reads as follows: "§ 112-f. Relief against mistake
of law. When relief against mistake is sought in an action or proceeding or by way
of defense or counterclaim, relief shall not be denied merely because the mistake is
one of law rather than one of fact." 5
To dispel any doubt as to the aim and scope of the new section, the Law Revision
Commission of the State of New York, in recommending the section to the Legislature for enactment, submitted the following statement: "Its purpose is to change
the existing rule which denies relief merely because the mistake is one of law. Its
purpose is not to grant relief in every case of mistake of law or to make the same
rules applicable as in the case of mistake of fact. It does afford to the court, however, the power to act in appropriate cases involving a mistake of law." Therefore
this new section effectively overrules the principle of the Bilbie case in New York,
and revives in this state the judicial power to grant relief in cases involving a mistake of law where the parties are equitably entitled to such relief.
The reasons which motivated this statutory enactment can best be appreciated
by examining the modifications and limitations of the Bilbie decision in this country
and particularly in New York. The remainder of this note will deal with the growth
of the doctrine in the 140 years that have elapsed since the distinction between mistake of law and mistake of fact first arose. The many exceptions to the rule have
been appended in a feeble attempt to obviate the harshness underlying it.
Although it was not until 1813 that the English courts recognized the Bilbie case
as binding authority on them, 7 an American court in 1809 refused to grant relief
for this type of mistake.8 Chancellor Kent was an ardent advocate of the doctrine
of refusing restitution in this country, proclaiming it to be a safe and wise policy.9
4. Seavey and Scott, Notes, RESTATEIIENT, REsTITUTION, (1937) ch. 2, Topic 3, p. 35.
Is not Seavey's language too broad when he states that the doctrine has been "almost
universally adopted"? See notes 16-26 infra.
5. N. Y. Laws 1942, c. 558. This section is effective immediately.
6. Leg. Doc. (1942) No. 65 (B) p. 3.
7. Brisbane v. Dacres, 5 Taunt. 143, 128 Eng. Rep. R. 641 (1813). Cf. Stevens v.
Lynch, 12 East. 38, 104 Eng. Rep. R. 16 (1810) where recovery was denied but no mention was made of Bilbie v. Lumley, 2 East. 469, 102 Eng. Rep. R. 448.
8. Williams v. Hodgson, 2 Har. & J. 474 (Md. 1809). Although Bilbie v. Lumley
was not brought to its attention, the court at 482 said: "It is also established by the
courts of law and equity, that ignorance of the law . . . cannot excuse or form a ground
for relief in equity . . ."
9. Chancellor Kent in speaking about mistake of law in Lyon v. Richmond, 2 Johns.
Ch. 51, 60 (N. Y. 1816) said: "The courts do not undertake to relieve parties from their
acts and deeds fairly done on a full knowledge of the facts, though under a mistake of
the law. Every man is to be charged at his peril with a knowledge of the law. There is
no other principle which is safe and practicable in the common intercourse of mankind."
In Storrs v. Barker, 6 Johns. Ch. 166, 170 (N. Y. 1822) he said: "It would seem, therefore, to be a wise principle of policy, that ignorance of the law, with knowledge of the
fact, cannot generally be set up as a defence."
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The jurists of that time expressed the fear that permission to set up a mistake
of the law as a defense in particular instances would allow the defense to run riot
throughout the entire field of the law. What these jurists apparently overlooked or
were unimpressed with is that this defense when permitted by the discretion of the
court would not overthrow all existing rules of law, but instead would allow the
courts to grant relief in cases where justice demands that relief should be granted,
without resorting to artificial formulae.10
Perhaps the most celebrated case in America on mistake of law is Hunt v. Rousmainere. 1 In that case the plaintiff lent money to the defendant's intestate, taking
back a letter of attorney with a power to sell, rather than a mortgage, under the
mistaken view of the law that in case of death the power of attorney would bind
the property equally as strongly a5 a mortgage. The court refused to grant any
relief saying that the plaintiff had with deliberation made his choice and he must
abide by the consequences of that decision. 12 And steadfastly through the years that
followed this decision, the courts have denied relief for a pure and simple mistake
of law.' 3
However, courts have realized that this doctrine is harsh and sometimes unjust,
and ".

.

. judges are always glad to discover some special equity, aside from the

mistake of law, which with the mistake may make their course more clear. Perhaps
judges have sometimes been too ready to steer away from the dangers of the
subject."' 14 From these inequities arose the great field of exceptions to the rule.
One broad basis of exceptions is that relief will be granted where there is a mistake
of law on the one side plus inequitable conduct by the other party.15 This inequitable
10. Connecticut and Kentucky have, by judicial decision, rejected the doctrine in toto
and grant relief for mistake of law where the situation warrants it. The fear expressed
by early jurists is controverted by the records of these two states. See Northrop v. Graves,
19 Conn. 547 (1849); Gilpatric v. Hartford, 98 Conn. 471, 120 Atl. 317 (1923); Underwood v. Brockman, 4 Dana 309, 29 Am. Dec. 407 (Ky. 1836); Kentucky West Virginia
Gas Co. v. Preece, 260 Ky. 601, 86 S.W. (2d) 163 (1935).
11. 8 Wheat. 174 (U. S. 1823) and 1 Pet. 1 (U. S.1828).
12. 1 Pet. 1, 14 (U. S. 1828). Story in commenting on this case says: "It is manifest
that the whole controversy in this case turned upon the point whether a Court of Equity
could grant relief where a security becomes ineffectual not by fraud or accident, or because
it is not what the parties intended it to be, but because, conforming to that intention,
the parties in executing it innocently mistook the law." 1 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENcE
(13 ed. 1886) 125. See also ibid. at § 114. When the case was up before the Supreme
Court the first time, Chief Justice Marshall seemed to intimate that a court of equity
could grant relief for a mistake of law. He said: "Although we do not find the naked
principle, that relief may be granted on account of ignorance of law, asserted in the
books, we find no case in which it has been decided, that a plain and acknowledged
mistake in law is beyond the reach of equity." Hunt v. Rousmaniere, 8 Wheat. 174, 215
(U.S. 1823).
13. Snell v. Insurance Co., 98 U. S.85 (1878) Bank of United States v. Daniel, 12
Pet. 32 (U. S.1838); Weed v. Weed, 94 N. Y. 243 (1883); Treadwell v. Clark, 124
App. Div. 260, 108 N. Y. Supp. 733 (1st Dep't 1908), app. dismissed, 192 N. Y. 531, 84
N. E. 1121 (1908); Matter of Williams v. Giespie, 161 Misc. 156, 291 N. Y. Supp. 513
(Sup. Ct. 1936); Matter of Welton, 141 Misc. 674, 253 N. Y. Supp. 128 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
14. 1 SToRY, EQuiTY JUiSPRUDENCE (13th ed. 1886) 112, n. (a).
15.

2 POMEROY, EQUITY

JURISPRUDENCE

(4th ed. 1918) § 847, and cases cited therein.

330
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conduct need not be willful or fraudulent, but may even be innocent. 10 Included in
this broad category are benefits obtained through fraud, 17 or through a confidential
relationship.' 8 In the latter case it would clearly be inequitable to allow a person
to retain any advantage gained through his peculiar relationship. Courts will, on
the other hand, deny a recovery where payment was made to effect a compromise. 19
The theory of the denial is that the person making the compromise had deliberately
made his choice. 20 Restitution will not be permitted where a party has in good
faith used the money paid under a mistake of law and cannot now repay, or where
he has otherwise altered his position in respect to the payment.2 1 The fiction that
everyone is presumed to know the law 22 is further restricted by intetpreting it as
meaning the law of one's own country and state, and thus we find cases allowing
recovery for a mistake of foreign law, the courts treating the mistake as one of fact. 23
Courts, particularly those in New York, usually allow a recovery where a govern16. Ibid.
17. Haviland v. Willets, 141 N. Y. 35, 35 N. E. 958 (1894); Cooke v. Nathan, 16
Barb. 342 (N. Y. 1853); see also MacNarnee v. Hermann, 53 Fed. (2d) 549 (App. D. C.,
1931); Jekshewitz v. Groswald, 265 Mass. 413, 164 N. E. 609 (1929); RESTATEZMVT,
REsTITUTioN (1937) § 55.
18. Pimpinello v. Swift & Co., 253 N. Y. 159, 170 N. E. 530 (1930); Tompkins v.
Hollister, 60 Mich. 470, 27 N. W. 651 (1886); Engelbrecht v. Engelbrecht, 323 Ill. 208,
153 N. E. 827 (1926) ; Jensen v. Snow, 131 Me. 415, 163 Atl. 784 (1933); Colby v. Life
Indemnity & Inv. Co., 57 Minn. 510, 59 N. W. 539 (1894).
19. Clarke v. Dutcher, 9 Cow. 674 (N. Y. 1824); Mowatt v. Wright, 1 Wend. 355
(N. Y. 1828); Sears v. Grand Lodge, 163 N. Y. 374, 57 N. E. 618 (1900); Butson v.
Misc, 81 Or. 607, 160 Pac. 530 (1916); Dalpine v. Lume, 145 Mo. App. 549, 122 S. W.
776 (1909). Many times courts call payments made in a compromise voluntary payments.
See M & T Trust Co. v. City of Buffalo, 266 N. Y. 319, 194 N. E. 841 (1935) where
recovery was denied on an invalid tax assessment, the court holding that the payment
was voluntary as a matter of fact.
20. The person usually has the choice of effecting a compromise or of litigating the
dispute. If he chooses to settle, the courts will not reopen the matter when the person
discovers that, as a matter of law, he would have been successful in court. Compromises
are favored by courts and they will uphold them wherever possible. 2 POILROy, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 850; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Chittenden, 134 Iowa
613, 112 N. W. 96 (1907).
21. Haviland v. Willets, 141 N. Y. 35, 35 N. E. 958; Holt v. Markham, [19231 1 K. B.
504 (1922). Recovery was denied in this case for two reasons: first, because there was
a mistake of law, and second, because the bonus which the defendant had received,
to which he was not entitled, had been invested in a company which had failed. See also
Ball v. Shepard, 202 N. Y. 247, 254, 95 N. E. 719, 721 (1911).
22. With regard to this maxim it is interesting to note the acrid comment of Abbott,
C.J. (afterwards Lord Tenterden) in Montriou v. Jefferys, 2 C. & P. 113, 116, 172 Eng.
Rep. R. 51, 53 (1825): "...
God forbid that it should be imagined that an attorney,
or a counsel, or even a judge is bound to know all the law. .. ".
23. Bank of Chillicothe v. Dodge, 8 Barb. 233 (N. Y. 1850); Vinal v. Continental
Construction Co., 53 Hun 247 (3d Dep't N. Y. 1889); Merchants' Bank v. Spalding,
12 Barb. 302 (N. Y. 1851); Nicholson v. Nicholson, 83 Kan. 233, 109 Pac. 1086 (1910);
see also Orth v. Kaesche, 165 App. Div. 513, 150 N. Y. Supp. 957 (1st Dep't 1914).
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mental body or official 'is suing for money paid under a mistake of law.24 The
reason for this exception to the rule is that the money involved is usually taxpayers'
money and to deny a recovery would work a hardship on the people generally.2 5
Recovery is not often permitted when an individual sues a governmental body;2 6
cases permitting a recovery do so on the basis that the payment, frequently of taxes
invalidly assessed, 27was made under duress and therefore cannot be considered a
voluntary payment.
The distinction between a mistake of law and one of fact is illusory and sometimes great difficulty is incurred in determining in which field the mistake lies.2s
An interesting case in this respect is Chanplin v. Laytin in which one judge based
his decision on the ground that the mistake was one of fact, and another judge
permits recovery, in a concurring opinion, on the basis of a mistake of law.2 9
24. Village of Fort Edward v. Fish, 156 N. Y. 363, 50 N. E. 973 (1898); People v.
Sutherland, 207 N. Y. 22, 100 N. E. 440 (1912); New York City Employees' Retirement

System v. Eliot, 267 N. Y. 193, 196 N. E. 23 (1935); New York Telephone Company
v. Board of Education of the City of Elmira, 270 N. Y. 111, 200 N. E. 663 (1936). The
above cases all permitted a recovery where the governmental body sued the individual.
The following cases involved one governmental body suing another: County of Erie v.
Town of Tonawanda, 95 Misc. 663, 159 N. Y. Supp. 714 (1916), aff'd, 176 App. Div. 942,
159 N. Y. Supp. 714 (4th Dep't 1917) (recovery permitted); Flynn v. Hurd, 118 N. Y. 19,
22 N. E. 1109 (1889) (recovery denied). Money paid to a court officer invalidly appointed was recovered in Matter of Voluntary Dissolution of the Home Provident Safety
Fund Association of New York, 129 N. Y. 288, 29 N. E. 323 (1891).
25. Village of Fort Edward v. Smith, 156 N. Y. 363, 375, 50 N. E. 973, 976 (1898):
"It is a matter of grave public concern to protect municipal corporations from the unonce
authorized and illegal acts of their agents in wasting the funds of the taxpayers ....
let, it go forth as the settled law of the state that an illegal contract can become the
basis of a lawful compromise ... and a new door will be opened to municipal spoliation.
...Sound public policy will not permit the courts to countenance this. .. ".
26. N. Y. & Harlem R.R. Co. v. Marsh, 12 N. Y. 308 (1855); Redmond v. Mayor, etc,,
125 N. Y. 632, 26 N. E. 727 (1891) ; M & T Trust Co. v. City of Buffalo, 266 N. Y. 319,
194 N. E. 841 (1935).
27. Adrico Realty Corp. v. City of New York, 250 N. Y. 29, 164 N. E. 732 (1928);
Moss Estate, Inc. v. Town of Ossining, 268 N. Y. 114, 196 N. E. 762 (1935); see also
Staten Island Hygeia Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. United States, 85 F. (2d) 68 (C. C. A.
2d, 1936) (misrepresentation by tax collector).
28. Champlin v. Laytin, 18 Wend. 407 (N. Y. 1837); Smith v. Hellman Motor Corporation, 122 Misc. 422, 204 N. Y. Supp. 229 (N. Y. City Ct. 1924); Woodruff v. Claflin

Co., 198 N. Y. 470, 91 N. E. 1103 (1910). In this case recovery could have been allowed
because of the fiduciary relationship of the administrator to the creditors as a whole.
E. R. Squibb & Sons v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 93 F. (2d) 475 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937);
Pitcher v. The Turin Plank Road Company, 10 Barb. 436 (1851).
29. 18 Wend. 407 (N. Y. 1837). The majority opinion allows recovery based on a
mistake of fact. Bronson, J., at 412 says: "Courts of equity may grant relief against
acts done and contracts executed under a mistake, or in ignorance of material facts; but
it is otherwise, I think, where a party wishes to avoid his act or deed, on the ground
that he was ignorant of the law. All men are presumed to know the law. .. ". In a
concurring opinion, Senator Paige allowed recovery under a mistake of law. He aptly

